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The intellectual history of the American Law Institute’s (ALI) 
restatement of torts project tells a tale of great ambition, 
imagination, success, and failure.  Unlike in other areas of the law, 
where parallel work by the Uniform Law Commission has led to the 
widespread adoption of uniform statutes across American states, in 
the law of tort, American courts generally continue to develop the 
law according to common law traditions on a case-by-case basis.1  
The tort restatements have played a critical role in shaping the 
debate on common law principles by American lawyers and jurists.2  
The latest iteration of the restatement, released in part in 2010,3 
 
       †   Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law; J.D., Yale Law 
School (2001); A.B., Harvard College (1998). 
 1. See Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort 
Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 927 (1996). 
 2. See Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement 
Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 436–37 (2004); see also Charles W. Wolfram, 
Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 820 (1998) 
(describing the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) as having essentially 
“launch[ed] . . . the products liability field of litigation.”). 
 3. The first portion of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm was released in 2010 (covering basic topics in the 
law of torts), while a follow-on portion, covering landowner liability, affirmative 
1
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will no doubt have a similar influence. 
The ambitions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) 
(Second Restatement)4 were far more sweeping than those of the 
Restatement (First) of Torts (1934) (First Restatement).5  The First 
Restatement seems almost quaint and unimaginative compared to 
the Second Restatement.6  This is perhaps not surprising, given that 
it was the ALI’s first attempt to “restate” the law7—perhaps scholars, 
commentators, and readers should praise the imaginative nature of 
the project itself, without nitpicking the authors’ substantive 
formulations of the law.  The First Restatement’s goals, however, 
were largely functional and positivist;8 it sought to provide certainty 
at the end of an era of perceived legal change by providing a 
“prima facie . . . correct statement of the general law of the United 
States.”9 
The First Restatement, prepared between 1923 and 1934,10 
preceded sweeping technological change that drastically altered 
the nature and economic impact of accidents—most notably the 
widespread adoption of that unparalleled instrument of death, 
destruction, and mayhem—the motorized carriage.11  The authors 
 
duties, and other topics, will be released in 2011.  See Current Projects, AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=16 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011). 
 4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). 
 5. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement 
(Fourth) of Torts, 50 UCLA L. REV. 585, 586–87 (2002) (describing the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts as a “monumental undertaking[]” that took more than two 
decades to complete).  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introduction, at 
ix (1965) (explaining that the Institute will articulate more comprehensively “the 
reasons for positions, taken,” as well as reporter’s notes and references to court 
opinions), with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, Introduction, at ix (1934) (noting 
that the Institute aims to have “the legal profession accept[] the Restatement as . . 
. a correct statement.”). 
 6. Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability—The 
American Law Institute’s Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 743, 
744 (1998) (“The diverse views of different state courts were slowly and carefully 
evaluated.  In general, when the Restatement (First) of Torts derived a rule, the 
majority rule was chosen.”). 
 7. Id. at 743. 
 8. Jordan K. Kolar, Note, Is This Really the End of Duty?: The Evolution of the 
Third Restatement of Torts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 233, 242 (2002). 
 9. Id. (quoting WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, 
Introduction, at ix (1939)). 
 10. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 744. 
 11. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 519–20 (3d ed. 
2005) (“By the 1920s . . . this was fast on the way to becoming a society of people 
with cars. . . .  [T]he automobile accident replaced the train accident as the staple 
2
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of the Second Restatement had the opportunity to reflect both on 
the nature of technological change12 and a window into emerging 
developments in insurance law and coverage that would come to 
change the on-the-ground realities of accident liability.13 
The authors of the Second Restatement had grand 
ambitions—hoping to move American tort law into a new age, and 
to leave behind many of the seemingly anachronistic limitations 
inherited from English tort jurisprudence.14  In areas from the law 
of causation in negligence, to the availability of damages in cases of 
mental distress, to the liability of the manufacturers of products, 
the authors of the Second Restatement’s various components 
proposed radical change in a document that, in many respects, 
reads like an academic’s polemic.15  In some areas, the Second 
Restatement succeeded wildly;16 in others, it was a failure of 
singular magnitude in the history of American law reform.17 
As the Restatement (Third) of Torts (Third Restatement) 
project nears completion, signs of its authors’ guiding principles 
emerge, both from their comments and writings, and from the 
nature of the document they have produced.  Unlike with the 
Second Restatement, the ALI structured work on the Third 
Restatement into a series of discrete projects.18  The Products 
Liability19 portions were published in 1998, the Apportionment of 
Liability20 provisions two years later, and the third piece, Liability 
 
of personal injury law . . . .”). 
 12. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 745. 
 13. Friedman, supra note 11, at 520 (suggesting insurance companies, 
reacting to widespread use of the automobile, became “[t]he real parties in 
interest” throughout the expansion of tort law). 
 14. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 745 (“Most importantly, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts differed from the Restatement (First) of Torts in that its content 
was shaped more by the Reporters’ and advisory committee’s evaluation of the 
wisdom of competing case law than a presumption to follow ‘clear majority’ 
rules.”). 
 15. In the Second Restatement, for the first time the ALI seems to have 
turned its attention to academic criticism of tort rules, and this may explain its 
new purpose: “normative prescription.”  Kolar, supra note 8, at 243. 
 16. For instance, the Second Restatement’s embrace of strict liability for 
defective product cases became widely adopted. 
 17. For instance, to the extent that its authors intended the “substantial 
factor” test to replace the traditional legal tests for cause-in-fact and proximate 
cause, the Second Restatement failed.  
 18. Michael D. Green & Larry S. Stewart, The New Restatement’s Top 10 Tort 
Tools, 46 TRIAL 44 (Apr. 2010). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000). 
3
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for Physical and Emotional Harm,21 entered its final stages in the 
last few years.22  
The story of the Third Restatement and its progenitors bears a 
remarkable resemblance to the great technological revolution of 
the century’s end: the World Wide Web.23  Observers of the internet 
have recently coined the phrase “Web 2.0” to describe the 
emergence of a second generation of internet offerings.24 
Under this formulation, the first generation of internet 
activity, “Web 1.0,” is recognized for its broad, sweeping ambitions, 
and for both spectacular successes and failures.25  First-generation 
web activity treated users as passive—presenting them with 
information or choices, but involving them in web content on only 
a limited basis.26  Many Web 1.0 sites, such as the online grocer 
Webvan, were spectacular failures.27  Spending on such sites 
matched their ambitions—Webvan, for instance, committed one 
billion dollars to build new warehouses soon before collapsing in 
 
 21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC 
PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. 
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009). 
 22. Green & Stewart, supra note 18, at 44. 
 23. Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information 
Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 191, 261 (2003) (explaining that the invention 
and development of the World Wide Web in the early 1990s allowed for the 
beginnings of widespread use of the internet by the general public).    
 24. Dale Dougherty reportedly coined the term to “describe technologies that 
turn the Internet into an active blend of mashed-together information.”  Elizabeth 
Corcoran, Hacking a Trend, FORBES MAG., Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.forbes.com
/forbes/2008/0901/080.html.  Others cite O’Reilly Media, Dougherty’s employer, 
as the origin of the term.  Brian Deagon, However It’s Defined, Web 2.0 Means Money; 
Tech Firms Scrambling to Cash in on New Wave of Internet Innovation, INVESTOR’S BUS. 
DAILY, Dec. 4, 2006, at A08; Dan Fost, What Exactly Does Web 2.0 Mean? Well…, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 5, 2006, at F5, available at http://articles.sfgate.com
/2006-11-05/business/17320641_1_world-wide-web-windows-platform-live-web/2; Web 
2.0 Defines Next Generation, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 30, 2007, at C2.  Perhaps fittingly, 
the term “Web 2.0” was selected to be the one millionth word in the English 
language.  Newest Word: Web 2.0, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June 11, 2009, at A2. 
 25. See Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part 
One—Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863, 880–81 (2008) 
(discussing the opportunities and shortfalls associated with Web 1.0).  
 26. See generally Mary Madden & Susannah Fox, Riding the Waves of “Web 2.0”: 
More Than a Buzzword, But Still Not Easily Defined, PEW INTERNET PROJECT (Oct. 5, 
2006), http://www.culturadigitale.it/Schede/PIP_Web_2.0.pdf (discussing the 
differences between user activity on Web 1.0 and Web 2.0).  
 27. Christopher Steiner, Bot-in-Time Delivery, FORBES MAG., Mar. 16, 2009, at 
40, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0316/040_bot_time_saves
_nine.html. 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss3/3
  
1586 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
2001 in a “spectacular disaster.”28 
The great revolution of Web 1.0 was the democratization of 
access to information.  So long as a person had access to the 
internet, she “had access to the same information as everyone else,” 
whether sitting in a “Harvard law library or a row house in Dublin 
or a grass hut in Africa.”29  “Web 1.0 users’ characteristic activity was 
surfing static Internet pages.”30 
Web 2.0, by contrast, is based upon the “architecture of 
participation.”31  Content in Web 2.0 is not locked onto pages, but 
broken up into “nuggets” that can be deployed wherever users 
want.32  Web 2.0 offerings are organic, rather than pre-planned, 
developing according to the preferences and drives of users rather 
than the visions of site planners and developers.33  The signal 
achievement of Web 2.0 is the internet encyclopedia “Wikipedia,”34 
in which users freely update encyclopedia entries.  The theory 
behind the site is that “if millions of eyes monitor encyclopedia 







 28. Id. 
 29. Justin Ewers, On the Record: Dan Nova, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 28, 2006, 
available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/060820/28record.htm. 
 30. Peter Lunenfeld, Welcome to Web 2.0, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 11. 
 31. Steven Levy, Farewell, Web 1.0! We Hardly Knew Ye., NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 
2004, at 20, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2004/10/17/farewell-web-
1-0-we-hardly-knew-ye.html. 
 32. Id. 
 33. According to advocates of the Web 2.0 concept, examples of the 
distinction include: 
Netscape the browser was the “standard bearer” for “Web 1.0”; Google 
the search engine is the new standard bearer.  In Web 1.0, Britannica 
Online became a popular reference; in Web 2.0, we have Wikipedia, 
which allows user input.  Rather than “publishing” content as we did in 
Web 1.0, we’re now “participating” in the dissemination of information. 
Daniel E. Harmon, The “New” Web: Getting a Grip on the Slippery Concept of Web 1.0, 
LAW. PC (West, Eagan, Minn.), Jan. 1, 2006, at 1. 
 34. David Wallace-Wells, Rage Against the Machine, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 2010, at 63, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/06/rage-against-the-machine.html. 
 35. Steven Levy, The New Wisdom of the Web: Why Is Everyone so Happy in Silicon 
Valley Again? A New Wave of Start-ups Are Cashing in on the Next Stage of the Internet.  
And This time, It’s All About . . . You, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 2006, at 47, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/2006/04/02/the-new-wisdom-of-the-web.html. 
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Under Web 2.0, the view of content-creators as “authoritarian 
figure[s] gives way to a . . . wisdom-of-the-crowds process.”36  The 
“great lesson of the Web 2.0 era is that to control quality, you don’t 
lock things down; you open them up.”37  Under Web 2.0, “everyone 
has a voice.”38  Web 2.0 moves from the notion, “if you build it, they 
will come,” to the notion, “if they build it, they will come.”39  Web 2.0 
transforms the internet experience from a lecture to a discussion.40  
User interface in Web 2.0 “yields a result that no amount of hands-
on filtering could have managed.”41  The key components of Web 
2.0 include “using the Web as a platform,” “harnessing collective 
intelligence,” and “enriching data for a deeper online 
experience.”42 
In spite of its apparent commercial power, Web 2.0 is not 
without its critics.  Michael Gorman foresees “a world in which 
everyone is an expert in a world devoid of expertise.”43  Still, the 
success of early Web 2.0 offerings provides strong support for the 
notion that internet users have long craved a more participatory 
role and that the days of “top down” internet development may 
have drawn to an end. 
Read by comparison to the Second Restatement, the new 
Third Restatement shares many of Web 2.0’s characteristics.  
Unlike the top-down approach chosen by the authors of the 
Second Restatement, in which sweeping reforms were “stated” to 
American courts, the authors of the Third Restatement have 
developed a more general, organic approach to the law of torts.  
This approach is participatory in the sense that it leaves state 
common-law courts the task of wrestling with the nuance of tort 
doctrine and filling the gaps in stated rules according to their own 
 
 36. Steven Levy, The Future of Reading: Amazon’s Jeff Bezos Already Built a Better 
Bookstore.  Now He Believes He Can Improve Upon One of Humankind’s Most Divine 
Creations: The Book Itself, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 2007, at 54, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/2007/11/17/the-future-of-reading.html. 
 37. Jimmy Wales, Open-Door Policy, FORBES MAG., May 7, 2007, at 190, available 
at http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2007/0507/190.html. 
 38. Ewers, supra note 29. 
 39. Id. (second emphasis added). 
 40. Colin Stewart, Whither Web 2.0?, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 24, 2006, 
available at http://www.ocregister.com/articles/web-41589-company-venture.html. 
 41. Levy, supra note 35, at 47. 
 42. Fost, supra note 24, at F5. 
 43. Michael Gorman, Web 2.0: The Sleep of Reason, Part II, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA BLOG (June 12, 2007), http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2007/06
/web-20-the-sleep-of-reason-part-ii/. 
6
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wisdom and experience. 
I. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT AS WEB 1.0 
A. Ambitions 
The Second Restatement was remarkable as a law reform 
document, if not quite the “statement” of the common law it was 
supposed to be.44  Its authors seemed to focus on the “re” rather 
than the “statement,” suggesting sweeping “re”-forms in a variety of 
areas of tort law.45  In that sense, for better at times and worse at 
others, the Second Restatement was inconsistent with the organic 
and evolutionary traditions of the Anglo-American common law.46  
Rather than wait for rules to crystallize across courts and across 
time, the authors of the Second Restatement sought to impose 
certain reforms on American tort law, in some cases, before the 
time for such reforms seemed to have come.47  As Victor Schwartz 
observed, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts Differed from the 
Restatement (First) of Torts in that its content was shaped 
more by the Reporters’ and advisory committee’s 
evaluation of the wisdom of competing case law than a 
presumption to follow “clear majority” rules. The so-called 






 44. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 745. 
 45. See id. (stating that many minority rules made their way into the “black 
letter” rules contemplated throughout the entire restatement). 
 46. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 2, at 817–19. 
 47. The appropriate role for the authors of a restatement is a subject of some 
contention.  David Robertson argues that “a ‘restatement’ of a body of court 
decisions should capture, explain, and enhance the best available judicial views, 
but . . . should not offer up as something visible or immanent in existing law any 
proposition or approach that is in realty brand-new, wholly lacking any trace of 
judicial acceptance.”  David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1008 (2009).  On the 
other hand, Ellen Bublick suggests that “when designing a system of liability, a 
Restatement need not be sanguine about adopting a patchwork of liability rules 
that cannot be reconciled on any principled basis.”  Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons—Thoughts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1335, 1336 (2009). 
 48. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 745. 
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Indeed, the Second Restatement likely represents the 
beginning of the ALI’s shift from simply stating the law to 
prescribing what the law should be.49 
The Second Restatement was a “compendious depiction of tort 
doctrines” that “functioned to provide courts and litigants with 
definitive fixed answers to tort questions.”50  It “emphasize[d] 
detailed treatment at the occasional expense of a general 
articulation of principles,” at times sacrificing “the opportunity that 
generalization presents to explore underlying rationales more 
fully.”51 
One of the great ambitions of the Second Restatement 
concerned liability for injuries caused by products.  Section 402A, 
promulgated in 1964, imposed liability for the sellers of products 
regardless of whether a seller “exercised all possible care.”52  This 
sweeping reform was embraced by courts “[w]ith a gusto 
unmatched in the annals of the Restatements of the Law.”53  David 
Owen observes, 
Tort law has probably never witnessed such a rapid, 
widespread, and altogether explosive change in the rules 
and theory of legal responsibility.  If ever a Restatement 
reformulation of the law were accepted uncritically as 
divine, surely it was section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.54  
To those who view the purpose of a restatement project as 
“restat[ing] the current law, not creat[ing] new law,” Section 402A 
represents “an anomaly.”55  The section “did not restate the law,” 
instead, it “created or molded products liability law for decades and 
has been referred to as the ‘bible’ or ‘holy grail’ of products 
liability law.”56 
 
 49. John H. Marks, The Limit to Premises Liability for Harms Caused by “Known of 
Obvious” Dangers: Will It Trip and Fall Over the Duty-Breach Framework Emerging in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts?, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2005). 
 50. Bublick, supra note 47, at 1340. 
 51. Deborah A. DeMott, A Revised Prospectus for a Third Restatement of Agency, 31 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1998). 
 52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 53. David G. Owen, Design Defect Ghosts, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 927, 935 (2009). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, The Impact of the Restatement (Third), Torts: 
Products Liability (1998) on Product Liability Law, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 105, 
105 (2008). 
 56. Id. But see George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Products Liability? 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 (2000) (“Section 402A ratified a 
body of product-defect case law emerging from the state courts in the 1960s.”). 
8
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B. Spectacular Failures 
Like many websites and businesses launched in the era of Web 
1.0, some of the Second Restatement’s reform efforts were 
spectacular failures.  Some of these failures became clear within the 
first years if not months of the promulgation of relevant 
restatement provisions, while others became cumbersome and 
unworkable over a longer period of time.57 
Perhaps the most ambitious doctrinal change in the Second 
Restatement concerned its treatment of causation in the law of 
negligence.  Traditional causation analysis required two steps.  
First, defendant’s conduct must have been a “cause-in-fact” of 
plaintiff’s injury, most commonly demonstrated by showing that, 
“but for” the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would have been 
free of the injury.58  Second, the defendant’s breach must have 
been a “proximate cause” of plaintiff’s harm—specifically, a cause 
near enough to the harm that it is appropriate to assign liability to 
the defendant.59   
Both traditional tests for the common law doctrine of 
causation are linguistically complex and difficult for both students 
of the law and courts to understand and apply.  The formulation of 
“but-for-cause” requires an awkward double-negative 60 in that one 
asks whether, without the breach, the plaintiff would be without 
damages,61 and challenges courts and juries to engage in counter-
 
 57. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 747–48 (noting that thirty years of 
litigation resulted when the restatement’s black letter formula substituted words 
from its authors in place of the exact language used in a pivotal case). 
 58. See John D. Rue, Returning to the Roots of the Bramble Bush: The “But For” Test 
Regains Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law Institute’s Proposed Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2681 (2003). 
 59. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, 
at 263 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that “proximate cause” is also frequently termed the 
“legal cause”). 
 60. In explaining how to formulate “but for” cause statements for analytical 
purposes, the author suggests students envision the test as their friend—indeed, 
their best friend—in most negligence problems.  So close a friend that it could be 
called a best friend forever, or a “BFF” in the common vernacular.  The mnemonic 
device “BFF” helps frame the but-for-cause inquiry as “But-For . . . Free”: but for the 
breach, would the plaintiff have been free of injury?  If this “BFF” question is 
answered in the affirmative, the breach IS a but-for-cause of plaintiff’s damages, 
and thus a cause-in-fact.  If answered in the negative, the breach is NOT a but-for-
cause of plaintiff’s damages, and thus not a cause-in-fact unless one of the special 
solutions available in cases such as concert-of-action, multiple sufficient causes, or 
alternative liability applies.  
 61. The “but-for” inquiry “is a significantly complex mental operation.”  David 
9
Rapp: Torts 2.0: The Restatement 3rd and the Architecture of Participat
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] TORTS 2.0 1591 
factual reasoning (what would have happened had X not 
occurred?) that arguably boils down to simple speculation.62  And 
the terms “proximate cause” are “weasel words,”63 which justify 
particular policy conclusions, but in and of themselves, appear to 
provide little analytical value. 
With that in mind, the authors of the Second Restatement, 
following the path of the First Restatement,64 jettisoned the 
traditional bipartite approach to causation in favor a single “legal 
cause” concept.65  In order to be liable in negligence, the 
defendant’s breach needed to be the “legal cause” of the plaintiff’s 
damages.66  “Legal cause” would be established only by a showing 
that the breach was a “substantial factor” in producing the harm.67 
In proposing this alternative formulation, the authors of the 
Second Restatement “walked off a cliff.”68  The test, according to 
the authors of the Third Restatement, has been a “major source of 
confusion and misunderstanding”69 and has not “withstood the test 
of time.”70  Notably, it has since been withdrawn from the torts 
treatise of Dean Prosser, its early champion.71  The failure of the 
 
W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1770 (1997). 
 62. Leon Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation?, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 
605 (1929); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. 
REV. 543, 556 (1962); Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation 
Between Counterfactual “But For” and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and 
Implications for Jurors’ Decisions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 250 (2001); E. 
Wayne Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause In Fact, 
46 TEX. L. REV. 423, 431–33 (1968). 
 63. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 6 n.8 (1970) (“I do not propose 
to consider the question of what, if anything, we mean when we say that specific 
activities ‘cause,’ in some metaphysical sense, a given accident; in fact, when we 
identify an act or activity as a ‘cause,’ we may be expressing any of a number of 
ideas.”). 
 64. See Rue, supra note 58, at 2681. 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (2010). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. §431 (“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to 
another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”). 
 68. Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, the Katrina Disaster, 
Prosser’s Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOY. L. 
REV. 1, 37 (2008). 
 69. Id. 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 cmt. j (2010). 
 71. Lavitt, supra note 68, at 37 n.161 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, 43–45 (5th ed. Supp. 1988) (“Even if ‘substantial 
factor’ seemed sufficiently intelligible as a guide in time past . . . the development 
of several quite distinct and conflicting meanings for the term . . . has created a 
risk of confusion and misunderstanding, especially when a court . . . uses the 
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Second Restatement’s causation provisions was quickly apparent.  
Barely a decade after the provisions were published, the ALI issued 
a new version under a new reporter, which attempted to 
characterize the earlier efforts as simply being statements about 
cause-in-fact—an effort which led to “further anomalies within the 
Restatement (Second) when read as a whole.”72  In sum, 
“substantial factor” was “mistakenly adopted.”73 
Certain aspects of the Second Restatement’s work on products 
liability can also be described as abject failures.  Even though the 
Second Restatement’s core notion that products liability claims 
should sound in strict liability—as well as via traditional negligence, 
warranty, and other actions—was widely followed,74 the actual 
doctrines released by the ALI for defining the scope of the 
products liability claim were difficult for courts to apply.  
In large part, this may be because the drafters of the Second 
Restatement presented a sweeping rule of strict liability for product 
injury claims based on a thorough understanding of only one type 
of product defect: mismanufacture.75  The second form of product 
defect, defective design, as it turned out, came to dominate the 
products liability caseload of courts in the latter part of the 
twentieth century.76  The rules articulated in the Second 
Restatement were so broad that they applied to all kinds of claims,77 
even though they turned out to be a poor fit in the design defect 
context.78  Courts have “struggled” since the Second Restatement’s 
 
phrase without indication of which of its conflicting meanings is intended.”). 
 72. Jane Stapelton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for 
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 971 (2001). 
 73. Lavitt, supra note 68, at 39. 
 74. Some have called Section 402A the “most successful section of the 
Restatement.”  Frank J. Vandall & Joshua F. Vandall, A Call for an Accurate 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Design Defect, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 909, 918 (2003) (noting 
3,000 citations of the section). 
 75. See Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement, Third, Torts: Products Liability: A 
Model of Fairness and Balance, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 42 (2000) (stating that 
the Second Restatement “shed no light on what should be the legal standard for 
defect of design”). 
 76. James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
377, 384 (2002) (stating that development of products liability has been and 
continues to be in the area of product design and marketing). 
 77. Larry S. Stewart, Strict Liability for Defective Product Design: The Quest for Well-
Ordered Regime, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (2009) (“Under 402A there was no 
distinction between manufacturing and design defect . . . .”). 
 78. Id. at 1043 (“Much confusion resulted in the ensuing arguments over the 
proper rule for design defect claims. . . . Resulting decisions were a hodge-podge 
of rule . . . .”). 
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products liability provisions were released regarding how to apply 
strict liability “beyond manufacturing defects . . . to the then-
emerging context of design safety, where section 402A’s consumer 
expectations test proved increasingly inadequate.”79  In time, courts 
began to understand that “principles of reasonableness were 
necessary to resolve the difficult issues of balance between product 
usefulness, safety, cost, practicality, and information dissemination 
inherent in such cases.”80  The difficulties in the standards 
established by Section 402A are well-documented.81  They arose 
because courts looked to the language of a broad rule for guidance 
in a new category of cases but “were searching for an answer that 
was not there.”82 
C. Content Control and “Over-Doctrinalization” 
The Second Restatement resembled Web 1.0 in that both 
represented top-down efforts to control content.  The products 
liability provisions of Section 402A of the Second Restatement, for 
instance, were “top down law reform[s] motivated . . . by the 
enthusiasm of a small group of Legal Realists that saw the 
opportunity to make what they saw as a small win-win change to 
legal entitlements.”83 
Although laid out in what appeared to be a “neat” fashion, 
many of the Second Restatement’s rules left important 
considerations unclear.84  Moreover, many of the Second 
Restatement’s rules proved cumbersome when actually taken up by 
common-law courts.85  Drafters of restatement language must strive 
to render statements of the common law that are correct in all 
cases.  Two approaches are available.  One, selected by the authors 
of the Third Restatement, is to describe rules in highly general 
 
 79. Owen, supra note 53, at 927. 
 80. Id. at 935. 
 81. Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts 
Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 832 (2009). 
 82. Schwartz, supra note 75, at 42. 
 83. Jane Stapelton, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REV. 
1225, 1229 (2002). 
 84. Id. (“The apparent neatness, low impact, and intellectual glamour of this 
move led its promoters to overlook major gaps in the theoretical foundations of 
the rule in the new § 402A.”). 
 85. For instance, the doctrinal formulation of recklessness is virtually 
incomprehensible.  See infra nn.89–99 and accompanying text. 
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terms.86  The other, at times selected by the authors of the Second 
Restatement, is to describe rules with painstaking clarity, including 
caveats, exceptions and the like in the formal statement of the 
rules.87  Unfortunately, the latter approach often produces 
language that says too much—that “overdoctrinalizes” the rules in 
question. 
Consider, for instance, the Second Restatement’s articulation 
of the important concept of reckless misconduct in tort law, 
described in section 500.88  Recklessness is an important concept in 
tort law because it provides an escape valve for traditional 
limitations on liability arising from a plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence or primary assumption of risk.89  In a range of contexts, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate recklessness on the part of a defendant 
responsible for an injury in order to meet the threshold for 
recovery.90  Moreover, recklessness has been established as a 
necessary threshold for the imposition of punitive damages.91 
The authors of the Second Restatement defined this concept 
in one of the longest, most awkward compound sentences in the 
history of American tort law: 
§500. Reckless Disregard of Safety Defined 
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of 
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act 
which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having 
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable 
man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an 
unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also 
that such risk is substantially greater than that which is 






 86. See Sugarman, supra note 5, at 587, 590. 
 87. See id. (referring to Professor Schwartz’s project in coming up with “fewer 
and better-presented basic principles that could come to replace a great number 
of the sections scattered throughout the four volumes of the Restatement 
(Second)”).   
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). 
 89. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 111, 134 (2008). 
 90. Id. at 115–16. 
 91. Id. 
 92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). 
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The comments that followed this section only amplified the 
confusion this language caused in the courts,93 as they made “little 
or no sense.”94  The rule itself was over-doctrinalized, establishing a 
test involving so many elements that the possibility of consistent 
jurisprudence was eliminated from the outset.95 
By contrast, the authors of the Third Restatement have 
defined the concept in a more organic fashion: 
§2.  Recklessness 
A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if: 
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the 
conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to 
another in the person’s situation, and 
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk 
involves burdens that are so slight relative to the 
magnitude of the risk as to render the person’s failure to 
adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person’s 
indifference to risk.96 
Notably, this section has moved to the beginning of the new 
Third Restatement, a recognition of its importance to courts 
developing tort doctrine.97  It also compacts the concept of 
recklessness into two central inquiries: (1) what was the defendant’s 
knowledge of the risk or facts suggesting risk?; and (2) does the 
defendant’s conduct constitute “aggravated negligence” under the 
traditional “Hand Formula” so as to demonstrate indifference?98 
Gone is the confusing language regarding intent.  Also gone is the 
implicit requirement that the risk-taker know that his conduct 
exceeds the legal threshold for negligence.  Section two of the new 
Third Restatement shows more faith in common law courts to 
develop, from the bottom-up, a set of rules to guide determinations 
of when wrongful conduct rises to the level of recklessness. 
 
 93. Rapp, supra note 89, at 133–52. 
 94. Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement 
(Third)’s Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1186 n.29 (2001). 
 95. Rapp, supra note 89, at 135 (“With the doctrine itself hopelessly ill-
defined, courts have not produced systematically coherent jurisprudence in the 
area.”). 
 96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
2 (2010). 
 97. Authors moved the definition of “recklessness” to Chapter 1, Section 2 in 
the Third Restatement. 
 98. James A. Henderson, Jr., et al., Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical 
Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1155–56 (2001). 
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II. THE THIRD RESTATEMENT AS WEB 2.0 
A. Organic 
Unlike earlier versions of the torts restatement, the Third 
Restatement is decidedly organic.  The bright-line rules and 
sweeping reforms of the Second Restatement have given way to law 
formulations structured in more flexible, open-ended terms.99  The 
Third Restatement is “conceptual” in nature—“focused on 
exposing principles and creating processes to guide the 
development of judicial responses to policy-oriented questions.”100 
Perhaps the best example of this concerns the Third 
Restatement’s treatment of toxic exposure, an issue that courts 
have struggled with since the 1980s.101  The ALI addresses this issue 
in section twenty-eight.  The section and its comments eschewed 
“bright-line rules,” instead recognizing that “whether an inference 
of causation is appropriate is a matter of informed 
judgment . . . .”102 
B. The Architecture of Participation  
The Third Restatement, from its early days, embraced the kind 
of bottom-up participation that is the cornerstone of Web 2.0.  For 
instance, the authors of the products liability sections of the Third 
Restatement were “centrally concerned with perceived bottom-up 
pressure on the U.S. products regime from ‘classic design cases.’”103  
In its “functional, negligence-based definition of design defect,” the 
Third Restatement “reflected how courts and lawyers around the 
nation increasingly were framing and litigating this central issue of 




 99. Bublick, supra note 47, at 1340. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Green & Stewart, supra note 18, at 46. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Stapelton, supra note 83, at 1229. 
 104. Owen, supra note 53, at 927.  But see Vandall & Vandall, supra note 74, at 
922 (“[T]he Restatement (Third) . . . delivers a radical concept of negligence and 
therefore misrepresents the law.”); Robert L. Habush, 10-Fall KAN. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 49, 53 (2000) (“[T]he Reporters . . . miscounted the judicial support for the 
reasonable alternative device requirement . . . .”). 
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In “deposing”105 the Second Restatement’s ambitious 
“substantial factor” and “legal cause” approach to causation in favor 
of linguistically simplified versions of the traditional “but-for” and 
“proximate cause” notions, the authors of the Third Restatement 
also embraced a participatory role, in this case for juries.  The “but-
for” causation inquiry chosen by the Third Restatement “is . . . 
more finely adjusted to reliably strengthen the core fact-finding of 
juries, and less likely to produce peculiar results.”106  
Moreover, the manner in which the test is framed suggests it 
represents an invitation for participation on the causation inquiry 
by courts and juries.  The Third Restatement is “articulate in 
silence as in enunciation,” allowing the “‘but for’ test to stand on its 
own for the first time . . . .”107 
C. Caveats 
Of course, there are exceptions.  With respect to owners and 
occupiers of land, the Third Restatement has embraced the 
controversial modern trend of a universal reasonable care 
standard, even though half of American jurisdictions continue to 
adhere to the traditional approach108 that imposes only limited 
duties on owners and occupiers of land, based on the category of 
injured entrant and the nature of the condition causing harm.109  
While there may be strong academic support for the universal 
reasonableness approach, even its supporters have criticized the 
manner in which the Third Restatement’s authors are attempting 
to promulgate the change.110  The Third Restatement aims to 
 
 105. Lavitt, supra note 68, at 39. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Rue, supra note 58, at 2716. 
 108. See Ann Fievet, Breaking the Law and Getting Paid for It: How the Third 
Restatement of Torts Synthesizes Two Distinct Standards of Care Owed to Trespassers, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 246 (2009) (stating that “twenty-six states have chosen to 
retain the traditional categories”). 
 109. See Green & Stewart, supra note 18, at 47. 
 110. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Land-Possessor Liability in Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Too Much and Too Little, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1079, 1079 
(2009)  (“I think that it is a mistake to have a separate chapter on land possessors. . 
. . [I]ntegrating the topic of land possessors into earlier sections would help us to 
make progress on two important substantive themes that, I believe, are not very 
helpfully addressed by the Reporters: (1) What are the reasons that justify any no-
duty rule in tort?  (2) In deciding what due care requires, when is a fair warning 
sufficient and when must the defendant eliminate . . . the danger by taking 
additional precautions?”). 
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“purg[e] . . .  a tradition of no-duty rulings based on case-specific 
unforeseeability . . . .”111 
III. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the success of the Third Restatement will only 
become clear as courts wrestle with its provisions.112  Similarly, the 
success of Web 2.0 ventures will be decided over time by the 
preferences of users and the commercial applications of such sites.  
However, both the Third Restatement and Web 2.0 seem 
positioned to succeed in a broader fashion than their predecessors, 
thanks to their organic, participatory, and bottom-up approaches. 
 
 111. Marks, supra note 49, at 4. 
 112. See MacDougall, supra note 55, at 116 (discussing the effect the Third 
Restatement may have on courts). 
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